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Money laundering is an international issue as the estimated amount of money laundered 
globally per year is 2-5% of the global GDP. Money laundering is a consequence of almost all 
profit generating crime, and thus can occur anywhere in the world. Many international 
instruments have been established to combat money laundering. 
This thesis describes money laundering, money laundering prevention, and how Finnish banks 
are obliged by the law to prevent money laundering. The purpose of this thesis is not to look for 
a solution to a problem, but rather to come up with an information package on money 
laundering and the prevention of it. The reader is provided with detailed information on what 
measures banks must take in order to combat money laundering. 
The Finnish anti-money laundering act is based on the EU rules. The EU rules are again based 
on international standards set by the Financial Action Task Force. The key principles of the 
Finnish anti-money laundering act are Customer Due Diligence and a risk-based approach. 
Banks must have sufficient information on their customers’ activities, financial status, banking 
practices, and purpose for which the services are used. If banks recognize suspicious 
transactions, they must report them to the Financial Intelligence Unit, who further investigates 
the suspicion of money laundering. 
This thesis is mainly a literature / law review where the most substantial information is gathered 
from various sources. A service manager of a Finnish bank is also interviewed to see how the 
law is applied in practice. Although the thesis is not written as an assignment given by a bank, it 
can be used as an orientation guide to money laundering prevention for new employees in the 
banking sector. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
I worked as a cashier service officer in a bank in the summer of 2015. Before 
that summer, I had never really thought about what money laundering actually 
is. Neither had I thought about all the anti-money laundering rules that apply to 
banks and various other service providers. When I started working at the bank, I 
was told about the anti-money laundering (AML) act, and how the bank is 
obliged by the law to know their customers and report suspicious transactions. 
As Customer Due Diligence (CDD) became a part of my everyday work, I 
thought it would be interesting to do more research about money laundering 
prevention, and to possibly write my thesis about the subject. 
To put it in a nutshell, money laundering is the process of making illegally-
gained funds appear legal. Due to the illegal nature of money laundering, it is 
difficult to estimate the total amount of money that goes through the laundry 
cycle (Sahavirta 2008, 38). There are no precise statistics available at all.  
However, according to the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, the 
estimated amount of money laundered globally per year is 2 – 5% of global 
GDP, or 800 billion – 2 trillion in US dollars (UNODC n.d.). Thus money 
laundering is a huge global issue. Money laundering is a consequence of 
almost all profit generating crime and can thus occur basically anywhere in the 
world (FATF n.d.). Globalization and rapidly developing technology has not only 
made money laundering easier for the criminals, but has also brought 
challenges to preventing money laundering. 
If money laundering is left unchecked or dealt ineffectively, the possible social 
and political costs are serious. Criminals can acquire control of large sectors of 
the economy through investments, offer bribes to public officials, and infiltrate 
financial institutions. The economic and political influence of organized crime 
groups may weaken the social structure, collective ethical standards and 
democratic institutions. Most importantly, laundering enables criminal activity to 
continue. Many times, a money laundering investigation is the only way to 
locate the hidden assets and establish the identity of the criminals responsible. 
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(FATF n.d..) Therefore it is important to continue developing international AML 
standards and national legislation. 
Criminals use, among others, financial service providers as intermediaries to 
launder their illicit funds. Banks are, among others, “parties subject to the 
reporting obligation”, which means that they are obliged to report suspicions of 
money laundering or terrorist financing to the Financial Intelligence Unit. Banks 
must know their customers well enough to be able to recognize unusual or 
suspicious transactions. Thus the key principles of the AML Act are CDD and a 
risk-based approach to money laundering and terrorist financing. 
Although financing of terrorism has its own special aspects, is often considered 
to be just a part of money laundering. The techniques used for financing 
terrorism and laundering money are very similar. Terrorist financing and money 
laundering are often placed under the same title. Therefore the Finnish AML law 
is called “Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
financing” (503/2008). However, I wanted to keep the thesis focused on money 
laundering and thus will only briefly define terrorist financing. Furthermore, 
money laundering and the prevention of it is a broad subject. Thus I wanted to 
highlight the main points of money laundering, and then focus on the AML 
legislation and how the law is applied in practice in banks. In order to keep the 
research focused, I also had to limit the handling of certain topics. In the last 
chapter, I will provide the reader with detailed information on how banks are 
obliged to combat money laundering. 
1.1 Research objectives 
The purpose of this thesis is not to look for a solution to a problem, but rather to 
present an overview on money laundering and what measures banks must take 
in order to prevent money laundering. The idea is to collect information from 
various sources in order to identify the main points in the anti-money laundering 
area. Although the thesis is not written as an assignment given by a contractor, 
it can be used as an orientation guide for new employees in the banking sector. 
By the end of the thesis, the following research questions will be answered: 
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1. What are anti-money laundering laws? 
2. How are banks obliged by the law to prevent money laundering? 
3. How the AML Act is applied in practice in banks? 
4. What does Customer Due Diligence involve? 
Although money laundering prevention is important, the measures have also 
been criticized by different parties. In the end of the report, I will discuss the 
effectiveness of anti-money laundering laws and measures. 
1.2 Structure of the thesis and research methods 
The thesis is divided into three main sections: money laundering, money 
laundering prevention, and the role of a bank in applying AML/CTF measures. 
In order to understand the AML/CTF measures, the process of money 
laundering must be understood. The first part of the thesis is dedicated to 
defining money laundering, the laundering process, and the prevalence of 
money laundering. The second part is about money laundering prevention 
beginning with international standards which work as a basis for the EU 
legislation. The EU legislation, then again, works as a basis for the Finnish AML 
legislation. Finally, the last part goes into detail about the Finnish AML Act, and 
how the law is applied in practice in banks. 
Different research methods are used in this thesis. However, this thesis is 
mainly about regulatory framework as it involves a lot of legal issues. Mainly 
secondary sources of information are used. The first part is largely a literature 
review where the most substantial information concerning money laundering is 
gathered. It slightly involves using quantitative methods, too, as statistics 
provided by the Finnish Financial Intelligence Unit are interpreted. The second 
part introduces the AML standards and laws starting from international level and 
then narrowing down to national legislation. Also the parties who the law applies 
to are introduced. In the second part, different organizations’ webpages, and the 
EU Directive and Regulation itself, are used as sources of information. The 
Finnish AML Act is introduced in this section, too. In the third part, the AML Act 
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is looked more deeply into as it is used as a basis for answering the question 
“how banks are obliged by the law to prevent money laundering”. The standard 
2.4 by Financial Supervisory Authority is used for giving concrete examples how 
the law should be applied. 
I deployed quaIitative research methods when conducting an in-depth interview 
in the third part of the thesis. I interviewed the service manager of a Finnish 
bank to get an insight how the bank applies the law. The interview was the most 
important primary source of information to this thesis. The interview questions 
were semi-structured, open-ended questions which enabled the interview to be 
more like a discussion. Due to the nature of preventing and detecting money 
laundering, the service manager could not give very exact answers to be 
published, though. However, I gathered the main points of the interview to 
support the theory. 
 
Figure 1. Money-Laundering (Caon 2015). 
 
2 MONEY LAUNDERING 
What is nowadays referred to as “money laundering” is traditionally said to 
originate from Mafia ownership of laundromats in the U.S. According to the 
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traditional theory, gangs that generated illicit cash from criminal activities, such 
as prostitution, extortion and gambling, purchased legitimate businesses 
through which they funneled the dirty money. Whether the theory is true or not, 
the term stuck and is now commonly accepted when talking about the process 
of making illegally-gained proceeds appear legal. (Turner 2011, 2.) 
It all stems from Al Capone, one of the biggest criminal leaders in the 1930s. 
Despite bootlegging whiskey and other crimes he committed, he was convicted 
of simple tax evasion. As gangsters saw what happened to Capone, they 
became more cautious with the origin, accounting and disbursement of their 
funds. Although the world is no longer the cash-based economy it used to be, 
the lessons that were learned by gangsters in attempting to avoid criminal 
prosecution are still used today. It has been said that Meyer Lansky, a major 
organized crime figure, developed the modern money laundering approach. The 
cash that was illegally gained in the U.S. was taken to Switzerland and then 
loaned back to the entities controlled and owned by gangsters themselves. The 
concept of “loan-to-back” is still a widely used mechanism for laundering cash; 
as with this route, the real timing of the illegally-gained funds is obscured. Also, 
it allows the launderers to declare and utilize cash while providing only limited 
resources for investigators. (Turner 2011, 2-3; Matonis 2013.) 
2.1 Definition 
Money laundering has been defined in various ways, depending on the source. 
The definitions used by regulators, law enforcements and criminal codes are 
mostly focused on either the accounting aspects or the criminal aspects (Turner 
2011, 3). According to Doug Hopton, the author of Money Laundering: A 
Concise Guide For All Business (2009), people believe that money laundering 
can be described in one of the following ways: turning dirty money into clean 
money, washing drug money, or disguising criminal money. He states that 
although the historical description is fine as far as it goes, the term “money 
laundering” is a misnomer as it does not recognize that in the modern world, 
money laundering does not have to involve actual money. In the modern world, 
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“money laundering occurs every time any transaction takes place or relationship 
is formed which involves any form of property or benefit, whether it is tangible or 
intangible, which is derived from criminal activity” (Hopton 2009, 2). The fact 
that criminal proceeds do not actually have to be moved in order to be 
laundered should not be overlooked. For example, when legitimately earned 
money is placed into a bank in another country and the account holder fails to 
declare the income on a tax return in the country in which it was earned, the 
funds become returns of a crime. Thus the bank is laundering the funds without 
necessarily knowing it. Also, even in a relationship where there is no obvious 
process of receiving or paying money, laundering can still occur: there are 
cases where criminals’ primary objective is to disguise the fact that they own a 
property. By doing so, the criminals want to break the connection between 
themselves and the property that could possibly link them to the criminal 
offence. (Hopton 2009, 2.) 
Jonathan Turner (2011), again states that most definitions of money laundering 
used by e.g. law enforcement agencies and regulators are incomplete to a 
proper understanding of the process. Traditionally, the money laundering 
process comprises three stages: placement, layering, and integration (Hopton 
2009, 2-3; Turner 2011, 3). The issue is that these definitions also cover a lot of 
legitimate activities. According to Turner, creating an adequate definition is 
challenging due to the fact that the basic roles and actions are often disputed. 
He states that in a criminal trial, for example, the standard definitions are 
disputed as the prosecution tries to place the activities under the money 
laundering title; whereas the defense argues those to be merely common 
business activities. (Turner 2011, 3.) Although the world has changed and there 
has been economic globalization, it can be said that the basic idea in money 
laundering is still the same: making dirty money appear clean. 
2.2 Terrorist financing 
Financing of terrorism is considered by many to be just a part of money 
laundering. To some extent it is correct, however, it does have its own special 
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aspects. Terrorist organizations require money for e.g. training, materials and 
travel expenses, so it is vital to them to have international flows of funds which 
they can use for their aims. Although many different methods are used by 
terrorists to raise the funds they need, the methods generally fall into one of the 
two categories: 1. funds from the supporter states or organizations 2. fund-
raising either from legitimate or illegitimate sources. Some examples of the 
second category are drug trafficking, people-smuggling, donations, charities 
and fundraising, kidnapping, and extortion. (Hopton 2009, 4-5.) As said, in the 
case of terrorist financing, funds can stem from both legal and illicit sources, 
whereas in the case of money laundering, the funds are always of illicit origin. 
The primary goal of individuals or organizations involved in the financing of 
terrorism is not necessarily to conceal the sources of money but to conceal both 
the financing and the nature of the financed activity. (IMF n.d..)  
In both terrorist financing and money laundering, the actor makes an illegitimate 
use of the financial sector. The techniques used for financing terrorism and 
laundering money are very similar and in many cases identical. Therefore, an 
effective counter-terrorist financing (CTF) and anti-money laundering (AML) 
framework has to address both risk issues: it must detect, prevent and punish 
illegal funds entering the financial system; and the funding of terrorist individuals 
and organizations. CFT and AML strategies converge as they aim at attacking 
criminals and terrorists through their financial activities, and they both use the 
financial trail to identify the components of the terrorist or criminal network. 
Mechanisms need to be put in place to read all financial transactions, and to 
detect suspicious financial transfers. (IMF n.d..) Due to the similarity in 
measures taken to make illegitimate use of the financial sector, both terrorist 
financing and money laundering are often placed under the same title. 
2.3 Where does laundered money come from? 
The underlying crime that gives rise to the illegally-gained funds to be laundered 
is called a “predicate offence”. The initial focus on money laundering occurred 
at the same time with the drug trade; nowadays, the trafficking of illegal drugs is 
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still one of the most common predicate offences committed. However, the 
number of predicate offences, and thus the scope of AML law, has inflated 
since the 1990s. These predicate offences nowadays include, among others: 
narcotics, tax evasion, robbery, fraud, extortion, bribery, smuggling, 
counterfeiting, insider trading, price-fixing, the illegal trade in arms and people, 
and kidnapping. (Turner 2011, 7; Sharman 2011, 17.) However, in Finland, the 
predicate offence may be any committed crime, as long as it has brought 
economic benefit for the perpetrator (Poliisi n.d.). It is important to remember 
that money laundering is not limited to organized crime groups, but money 
laundering also appeals to lawyers, accountants, and other service providers 
who facilitate money laundering (Turner 2011, 27). For example, Russian 
underworld groups paid corrupted senior Bank of New York officials $1.8 million 
to launder $7 billion during a three-year period (Sharman 2011, 17). However, 
according to Mariano-Florentino Cuellar’s research paper (2003) (as cited in 
Sharman 2007, 18), “rather than one set of criminals paying for the services of 
independent money launderers, it seems that most laundering is done in-house 
by the criminals who perpetrated the original predicate crime”. 
2.4 Three Stages 
There is not only one way of laundering money or other property. Money 
laundering can range from the simple method of using money in the form in 
which it was acquired to extremely complex schemes involving a web of 
international businesses and investments. However, money laundering has 
traditionally been divided into three stages: placement, layering, and integration. 
These stages often occur simultaneously or overlap, although they can also be 
separate and distinct. (Hopton 2009, 2-3; Turner 2011, 8.) It all depends on the 
facilities of the launderer, the requirements of the criminals and the prevailing 
regulations linked to the effectiveness of the monitoring systems of the financial 
or regulated sector. Although the three-stage model is a convenient way of 
describing money laundering, it has been criticized to be too simplistic as it 
does not adequately cover all situations in which money laundering occurs. 
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(Hopton 2009, 3.) However, the traditional three stages are introduced in the 
following sections. 
 
Figure 2. The Money-Laundering Cycle (UNODC n.d.). 
2.4.1 Placement 
The placement stage represents the initial entry of the illicit cash or proceeds of 
crime into the financial system. This stage serves two purposes: it relieves the 
criminal of holding and guarding large amounts of cash; and it places the money 
into the legitimate financial system. During the placement stage, money 
launderers are the most vulnerable to getting caught. This is because placing 
large amounts of money into the legitimate financial system may arise 
suspicions. (About Business Crime Solutions Inc. n.d..) Many laws and 
regulations concentrate on the prevention of money laundering, and therefore it 
is highlighted that financial service providers – as well as others subject to the 
reporting obligation – should recognize customers’ unusual activities and report 
suspicious transactions. Thus it is important for service providers to know their 
customers and understand their conventional financial transactions. The AML 
legislation will be introduced later on. 
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The placement of the proceeds of crime can be done in many ways. The most 
common method is to deposit money into a financial account in a bank, an 
investment firm, or an insurance company. The money may also be shipped to 
a foreign financial organization to further obscure the path. (Turner 2011, 9.) 
Due to the AML laws, a large sum of money cannot be deposited into an 
account without raising suspicion. Thus launderer can use “smurfs” to defeat 
reporting threshold laws and avoid suspicion. This technique involves the use of 
many individuals, the smurfs, who in small and less conspicuous amounts 
exchange the illegally-gained proceeds for highly liquid items such as bank 
drafts and travelers cheques. These instruments are then given back to the 
launderer. Other methods for placement of funds are, for example, repayment 
of loans with illegal proceeds, purchase of gambling chips or placing bets on 
sporting events, purchase of foreign currency with illegal funds, and blending 
funds. Fund blending is a method where a legitimate cash focused business is 
used for co-mingling illicit funds with legitimate sales receipts. Another method 
for placement of funds is to use cash to buy works of art or other high-value 
items such as precious metals and jewelry. These items can be moved to a 
foreign country to be exchanged for cash, and the cash can then be deposited 
into a bank account in that country. (Sahavirta 2008, 24-31; About Business 
Crime Solutions Inc. n.d..) 
The more organized the crime is, the more complex the money laundering 
process usually is. The proceeds of crime may get into the legal financial 
system through actions of so called gatekeepers. For example law firms may 
work as “professional enablers” providing legitimacy to the funds. They may 
place the illicit funds on the client accounts and then make transactions to third 
parties. (Sahavirta 2008, 30; Solicitors Regulation Authority 2014.) “Money 
laundered through law firms does not always involve actual legal transactions, 
and may instead involve passing the money through the client account to make 
it look legitimate, when no legal work has been undertaken” (Solicitors 
Regulation Authority 2014). Other legal parties, such as auditors and 
professional participants in the securities markets, may also become involved in 
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the criminal activities. (Sahavirta 2008, 30). Thus the AML legislation applies to 
attorneys, auditors and investment firms, too. 
2.4.2 Layering 
The second step in money laundering process, layering, involves stratifying the 
financial transaction. As the objective is to hide the illicit origins, the more layers 
are added to the process, the more difficult it will be to prove the illicit basis for 
the funds. At its simplest, layering is shifting the funds from one account to 
another, or moving them from one institution to another. Once the funds are in 
the financial system, it is rather easy to move them around the world. However, 
moving money from one account to another is easy to trace. To make tracing 
more difficult, criminals shift the money through various asset types although it 
incurs costs for buying and selling. Layers often include various financial 
accounts, high-value items, equipment and currency sales, and purchases of 
legitimate businesses. (Turner 2011, 9.) 
Criminals may use loans or mortgages to layer and integrate illegally-gained 
funds into real estate and other high-value assets. For example, back-to-back 
loans are used. (Sahavirta 2008, 31.) “A back-to-back loan is a credit instrument 
under which funds or financial instruments are made available to the borrower. 
The bank receives collateral, whether direct or indirect, from the borrower’s own 
liquid assets. This occurs, for example, where a person has liquid assets and, 
instead of using them to meet his cash needs, raises a bank loan that is 
secured by the liquid assets in question” (De Nederlandsche Bank 2007). In the 
case of money laundering, the collateral is the illicit money placed in a third 
country. When the debtor fails to pay the debt, the bank realizes the collateral. 
(Sahavirta 2008, 31.) This way the criminal has documents to prove the source 
of the funds, which is the bank loan, and the bank that gave the loan gets its 
money back – or at least part of it – by realizing the collateral. 
Some countries are structured to assist in these money laundering transactions. 
In these countries, legal and accounting firms often assist in setting up shell 
companies to help layering the transactions. Trusts and shell companies 
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disguise the true owner of the funds. In these countries, due to various bank 
secrecy laws, attorney-client privilege, and working with a local attorney, money 
launderers can move huge sums of money around the world. (Sahavirta 2008, 
32-33; Turner 2011, 9.) Some of the most popular locations to hide cash include 
Cayman Islands, Bahamas, Monaco, Switzerland, Luxembourg, and Malta. 
When selecting an offshore location, money launderers consider many factors 
such as the strength of the secrecy laws, business language spoken, political 
climate, and the likelihood of extradition being facilitated by the local authorities. 
Many countries happily turn a blind eye to criminal acts as long as they have 
occurred elsewhere. To encourage cash-strong people to invest in their country, 
many governments have even passed various tax laws to encourage the 
migration of funds. Tax exemptions of foreign or investment income and 
payment of so called “past taxes” in return for citizenship or resident alien are 
examples of these kinds of inducements. Money launderers park their funds in 
international accounts to protect them from taxation, seizure, and the courts. 
(Turner 2011, 71-73.) Criminals may later ship the illicit funds back from these 
tax havens as foreign direct investments. This method is called “round-tripping”. 
(HG.org n.d..) 
Due to the bank secrecy laws that often prevail in these tax havens, it is difficult 
to track the illicit funds. Once the criminal funds are placed in these tax havens, 
they are free to be used or transferred elsewhere. That’s why detecting also 
exports of funds from the home country is important. 
Another method for layering the illegally-gained funds is over-invoicing 
(Sahavirta 2008, 32; Francis 2014). In her article “A Beginner’s Guide To Money 
Laundering” (2014), Diane Francis writes that “The real big shots don’t bother 
with casinos, crooked bank managers, junkets, or smurfs. They manage to 
transfer millions, or billions, without handling cash or involving banks at all, 
instead funneling their money through corporate deals (bribes, kickbacks, and 
embezzlement schemes), which are exempt from currency controls”. Ritva 
Sahavirta, the author of “Rahanpesu rangaistavana tekona” (2008), states that 
when over-invoicing, the two companies involved must have a common interest. 
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They may be commonly owned, for example. The two companies may be 
located in the same country, but usually the other one is registered offshore. 
They often do import/export business. The offshore company over-invoices 
company X for the exported goods, and the illegally-gained funds of company X 
are transferred to the offshore company. The difference between the actual 
value of the goods and the high price that was paid can be later on loaned back 
to company X. This way the illicit funds become laundered, and company X can 
prove that its incoming funds are originating from the loan given by the offshore 
company. (Sahavirta 2008, 32.) The more professional the money laundering is, 
the more complex the layering methods are. When using complex back-to-back 
loans and over-invoicing methods, it is probably about huge sums of “dirty” 
money. 
2.4.3 Integration 
The final stage of money laundering process integrates the seemingly legitimate 
funds into the perpetrators life. The income is returned to the criminal in a form 
that withstands ordinary scrutiny. (Sahavirta 2008, 33; Turner 2011, 9-10.) 
Having been placed initially as cash and layered through various financial 
transactions, the criminal funds are now fully integrated into the financial system 
and may be used for any purposes. The major objective at this stage is to 
reunite the money with the criminal without drawing attention. The money can 
be used for purchasing e.g. high-end automobiles, jewellery, property, and art 
work. (About Business Crime Solutions Inc. n.d..) 
The methods used at this integration stage are defined slightly differently 
depending on the source. According to Turner (2011, 9), the integration stage 
has certain parity with the layering process. He states that one example of the 
integration methods is to use “front companies to ‘borrow’ funds from the foreign 
financial institution holding the illicit funds because the ‘loans’ are guaranteed 
by the deposits and the ‘lending’ institution faces no risk. Another common 
approach is the over-invoicing of goods or services, --.” Thus Turner places 
back-to-back loans and over-invoicing under the integration title. Sahavirta, 
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instead, places these activities under the layering title. However, as said earlier, 
the stages are not always separate and distinct, but can occur simultaneously 
or overlap. Therefore it is not always clear what activity goes under each title. 
Maybe, in today’s world, it is not even necessary to try to categorize money 
laundering activities under different titles. 
2.5 Modern money laundering methods 
Money laundering is increasingly becoming a cybercrime as modern criminals 
are focusing on the internet. Technology in a rapidly changing financial 
environment facilitates the movement of criminals’ money. (Turner 2011, 89; 
MIT Technology Review 2013.) Modern methods of money laundering make 
tracing the illicit funds increasingly difficult. 
In a short period of time, virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, have developed into 
a powerful payment method. Whereas virtual currencies offer an innovative, 
flexible and cheap method of payment, its unique business model poses a 
challenge to regulators around the world. The policy responses vary 
significantly: some countries embrace this new technology while others severely 
or totally limit its legitimate use. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
conducted a research into the characteristics of virtual currencies to make an 
initial assessment of the money laundering and terrorist financing risk 
associated with this payment method. When it comes to legitimate use of virtual 
currencies, they offer many benefits such as lower transaction costs and 
increased payment efficiency. They also facilitate international payments. 
However, the FATF found that virtual currencies have certain characteristics, 
coupled with their global reach, that present potential money laundering and 
terrorist financing risks. 
 
These risks include: 
 Anonymity provided by the trade in virtual currencies on the internet 
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 Limited identification and verification of participants 
 Lack of clarity regarding the responsibility for AML/CFT compliance, 
supervision and enforcement for these transactions that are segmented 
across several countries 
 Lack of a central oversight body 
According to the FATF’s report on virtual currencies, this virtual payment 
method has already been abused for money laundering purposes. (FATF 2014.) 
Another increasingly common method to launder money in today’s world is to 
use online gaming. In a number of online games, it is possible to convert money 
from the real world into virtual goods or services. These virtual goods or 
services can then be converted back into real money. Popular games for scam 
like this include Second Life and World of Warcraft. (MIT Technology Review 
2013.) 
In addition to so called mule scams, where individuals’ accounts are used for 
transferring large amounts of money, there are scams where people are offered 
jobs in which they can make significant income working from home. The “job” 
involves accepting money transfers into their accounts and then transferring 
these funds on to accounts set by the “employer”. (MIT Technology Review 
2013.) Modern money laundering methods also include using phones and 
smartcards, but I won’t go into further detail about them in this thesis. However, 
as technology becomes more developed all the time, criminals constantly come 
up with new methods for laundering money. 
2.6 Money laundering globally 
Due to the illegal nature of money laundering, it is difficult to estimate the total 
amount of money that goes through the laundry cycle (Sahavirta 2008, 38). 
There are no precise statistics available at all.  According to the United Nations 
Office on Drugs and Crime, the estimated amount of money laundered globally 
per year is 2 – 5% of global GDP, or 800 billion – 2 trillion in US dollars. 
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(UNODC n.d..) However, these estimates should be treated with caution as they 
are only intended to give an estimate of the extent of money laundering (FATF 
n.d.). 
Money laundering is a consequence of almost all profit generating crime, and 
therefore it can basically occur anywhere in the world. Generally, criminals tend 
to look for countries or sectors in which there is a low risk of detection. These 
countries usually have weak or ineffective AML programmes. Because the 
objective of money laundering is to get the illicit funds back to the criminal who 
gained them, launderers usually prefer to move the funds through stable 
financial systems. (FATF n.d..) Diane Francis, the author of the article “A 
Beginner’s Guide to Laundering Money” (2014), states that according to UN, the 
largest recipient of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) in 2013 was the British 
Virgin Islands, an archipelago with 23 000 residents. About $92 billion in foreign 
cash got washed up there. Other havens that received massive “investments” 
include Monaco and Cayman Islands. (Francis 2014.) Francis also states that 
the money doesn’t necessarily stay where it gets washed, but is later on used 
for purchasing e.g. condos and other property in different countries. 
The Basel Institute on Governance, a non-profit organization, creates annually a 
research-based ranking focusing on the risk of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. It is called the Basel AML Index, and it was first published in 2012. 
Altogether 14 indicators dealing with AML/CTF regulations, corruption, financial 
standards, political disclosure, and rule of law, are aggregated into one risk 
score. Since there are no quantitative data available, the Basel AML Index 
doesn’t measure the actual existence of money laundering within a country, but 
rather indicates the risk level, the vulnerabilities so to say, of money laundering 
and terrorist financing within a country. The overall score is derived from 
indicators based on publicly available sources such as the FATF, the World 
Bank and Transparency International. The Basel AML Index is annually issued 
in two versions: the Expert Edition and the Public Edition. The Expert Edition 
provides a more comprehensive data set and serves as a tool for compliance 
officers. (The Basel Institute on Governance 2015, 1.) 
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The scores range from 0-10 where 0 indicates the lowest risk and 10 the 
highest risk (The Basel Institute on Governance 2015, 2). I won’t go into further 
detail about the Basel Institute’s methodology for calculating the overall score; 
the methodology is described in detail in the Basel AML Index 2015 Report. The 
map below shows the areas in the world where the risk levels are the highest. 
 
Figure 3. Country map (Basel Institute on Governance 2015). 
The top five high-risk countries of the Basel AML Index 2015 risk rating are Iran, 
Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Guineau-Bissau, and Mali. More specifically, Iran is the 
highest risk country of the world with a score of 8.59. These high-risk countries 
are characterized by weaknesses in both preventing money laundering and 
terrorist financing, and enforcing multiple aspects of the AML/CFT framework. 
They also have structural and functional vulnerabilities such as high rates of 
perceived corruption, lack of resources to monitor the financial system, lack of 
judicial strength, and lack of public and financial transparency. (The Basel 
Institute on Governance 2015, 4.) 
Finland, then again, is the lowest risk country with a score of 2.53. Estonia is 
the second lowest risk country with a score of 3.19. Finland and Estonia are the 
only countries that are below the risk threshold of 3.3, indicating a strong 
AML/CTF compliance level, low levels of corruption, and high financial and 
public transparency. (The Basel Institute on Governance 2015, 4.) 
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Also The FATF identifies jurisdictions that have strategic deficiencies in their 
AML/CTF procedures. (The FATF will be introduced in chapter 3.1.) The 
jurisdictions with most serious deficiencies are identified in two public 
documents that are issued three times a year. The FATF’s last public statement 
was published in October 2015, stating that countries should apply counter-
measures to Iran and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. The FATF 
also called its members to consider the risks arising from the deficiencies 
associated with Myanmar. (FATF 2015.) Furthermore, the FATF identifies 
countries that have deficiencies in their AML/CTF measures, but who have 
developed action plans with the FATF to improve their AML/CTF regimes. 
However, I won’t go into further detail about these countries. 
To conclude, it can be said that developed countries are up to date with their 
AML/CTF measures, whereas developing countries have major deficiencies in 
their systems to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Consistency 
with AML/CTF tools between different countries would be important in 
combating these crimes. 
2.7 Money laundering in Finland 
In Finland, the so called AML Act, which is better introduced later in this thesis, 
imposes an obligation on certain service providers, such as financial institutions, 
to monitor their customers’ transactions and use of services. (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2011). If these parties have suspicions of money 
laundering, they shall immediately report a suspicious transaction or a suspicion 
of terrorist financing to the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) (Act on Detecting 
and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 
23). The FIU, which operates under the National Bureau of Investigation, has 
gathered information about the current state of AML/CTF actions in their annual 
report. In 2014, the FIU received 23 062 reports, which included 558 699 
transactions. In the reporting system, it is possible to add several suspicious 
transactions to one report. (Krp 2014, 7-8.) The figure below shows the variety 
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of the reporting parties and the amount of reports each of them submitted to the 
FIU in 2014. 
Table 1. Reporting parties (Krp 2014, 8). 
Reporting parties Reports in 2014  
  Banks 1 125 
Investment firms 8 
Other credit- and financial institutions 367 
Insurance companies 156 
Real estate businesses 10 
Gaming operators 9 100 
Payment service providers (including foreign exchange) 12 092 
Accounting firms 11 
Auditors 4 
Advocates 4 
Businesses dealing with valuable goods 89 
Pawnshops 3 
Management companies 2 
Finnish police officers 2 
Other Finnish authorities 82 
Others 7 
  
In total 23 062 
 
The figure tells that money launderers prefer payment service providers, 
gaming operators and banks as intermediaries to transfer their illegally-gained 
funds. Payment service providers reported suspicions of money laundering 
most frequently: in 2014, they submitted 12 092 reports to the FIU. 
In 2014, the FIU uncovered 44 new cases where pre-trial investigations were 
carried out later on. In addition to that, the FIU disclosed information to 246 
cases where pre-trial investigations had already started earlier. In some cases, 
there were hundreds of reported transactions that supported the suspicion of 
money laundering. Almost all the reported cases were related to economic 
crimes. (Krp 2014, 13.) In Finland, most laundered money originates from 
economic crimes, whereas globally most originates from drug related crimes 
(Poliisi n.d.). In statistics, suspicious transactions are categorized into different 
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groups according to their nature. In the online reporting system, it is possible to 
choose one or more reasons for reporting the suspicion of money laundering. 
Therefore the amount of reasons that led to reporting is bigger than the amount 
of actual reports: 25 963 > 23 062. However, “the amount of money included in 
the transaction” was the most common reason to report suspicion of money 
laundering. (Krp 2014, 9.) 
Table 2. Types of suspicious transactions (Krp 2014, 9). 
Suspicious transaction 2014 
  Cash deposit 447 
Cash withdrawal 263 
Wire transfer 2 756 
Capital recycling 304 
Currency transfer 483 
Currency exchange 45 
Insurance 11 
The amount of money included in the 
transaction 17 712 
Sale of goods 93 
Carrying cash 59 
Other suspicious transaction 3 790 
  In total 25 963 
 
The next statistics are interesting as they show the amounts of money, which 
involved suspicions of money laundering, that crossed the Finnish border in 
2013 and 2014. The figures are based on the reports that the parties subject to 
the reporting obligation submitted to the FIU. In 2013, altogether almost 50 
million euros, involving suspicions of money laundering, crossed the Finnish 
border. In 2013, there were suspicious money transfers from Finland worth 
around 33,6 million euros, whereas suspicious money transfers from abroad to 
Finland were worth around 15,5 million euros. (Krp 2014, 10.) What’s more 
interesting is how much the amount of incoming suspicious money increased in 
a year. In 2014, suspicious money transfers from abroad to Finland were worth 
around 330 million euros. Especially the amount of money transferred from 
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Europe and Asia increased enormously. (Krp 2014, 10.) I e-mailed the FIU to 
ask for the reason for this increase but they never got back to me. 
Table 3. Money transfers from Finland abroad (Krp 2014, 10). 
Money transfers from Finland 
abroad 2013 / € 2014 / € 
   Europe 17 918 587 21 349 401 
Asia 7 842 405 8 367 070 
Africa 6 064 216 6 142 339 
America 1 665 541 1 047 797 
Oceania 61 260 37 738 
Unknown 42 346 1 153 063 
   In total 33 594 355 38 097 408 
 
Table 4. Money transfers from abroad to Finland (Krp 2014, 10). 
Money transfers from abroad to 
Finland 2013 / € 2014 / € 
   Europe 10 450 608 172 582 943 
Asia 2 095 555 151 039 289 
Africa 1 008 473 1 054 023 
America 1 384 539 2 653 854 
Oceania 177 978 174 675 
Unknown 348 574 2 884 022 
   In total 15 456 727 330 388 806 
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3 MONEY LAUNDERING PREVENTION 
Money laundering and terrorist financing are international issues. Various 
groups, accords, and treaties express a global focus on money laundering and 
how it is related to other crimes. Most nations see that permissive policies and 
structures can prompt criminal acts. The international community is nowadays 
willing to establish standards and codes of conduct relative to financial crime 
enforcement. Although the codes vary on the specific legal language, in 
general, they include guidelines on local, global, and multilateral cooperation, 
methods of capital flows across borders, record holding, requirements for 
customer identification and the description of suspicious transactions. Thus 
there has been an increase in cross-border coordination of investigations into 
corruption, misconduct, organized crime, and tracking the proceeds of crime in 
the global economy. (Turner 2011, 83.) 
Many international instruments, including a number of international treaties, 
have been established to prevent and combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing. These treaties impose far-reaching obligations on individual states in 
international co-operation when it comes to preventing, combating and 
criminalizing money laundering and terrorist financing. Council of Europe 
Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the Proceeds 
from Crime (53/1994) is one example of these international instruments. In 
addition to Interpol and Europol, several international organizations are 
established to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There is also 
“The Global Programme against Money Laundering” that operates under The 
United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime. (Poliisi n.d..) The Egmont Group, 
then again, is an informal network of Financial Intelligence Units (FIUs) 
established in 1995 to foster international co-operation. The group consists of 
more than 110 FIUs. (The Egmont Group n.d.; Poliisi n.d..) FIU.NET is a 
decentralized computer network created for the FIUs in the EU to enhance their 
collaboration (Poliisi n.d.). The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), then again, 
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is the most important international body to establish standards on AML and CTF 
measures. 
The chart below shows how the international standards, and most importantly, 
the recommendations set by the FATF, form the basis for the EU’s AML rules. 
Then again, the AML legislation in Finland is based on the EU Directive and the 
Regulation. The AML Act imposes an obligation on the parties subject to the 
reporting obligation inclunding banks, accountants, etc. The Financial 
Supervisory Authority ensures that the supervised entities meet the statutory 
requirements. Lastly, parties subject to the reporting obligation have to report a 
suspicious transaction or a suspicion of terrorist financing to the Financial 
Intelligence Unit. All these parties are introduced in the following sections. 
 
Figure 4. Interrelation between legislation and the ones the law applies to 
(Kuustie 2015). 
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3.1 The FATF 
The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) was established in 1989 by the 
Ministers of its Member jurisdictions. It is an inter-governmental body whose 
objectives are to set standards and promote effective implementation of legal, 
regulatory and operational measures for combating money laundering as well 
as terrorist financing and other threats to the international financial system. 
Thus the FATF is a policy-making body whose aim is to generate the necessary 
political will to give rise to national legislative and regulatory reforms in these 
areas. The FATF currently comprises 34 member jurisdictions and 2 regional 
organizations, thus representing most major financial centres in all parts of the 
world. (FATF 2015.) The Presidency of the FATF is a one-year position held by 
a senior government official appointed from among the FATF members. He is 
supported by the FATF Secteriat which is located in the headquarters of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in Paris. 
However, despite its location, the FATF is an independent body, and not part of 
the OECD. (Hopton 2009, 19.) 
The FATF has created a series of recommendations on combating money 
laundering and financing of terrorism and profileration of weapons of mass 
destruction (FATF 2015). These Forty Recommendations form the basis of the 
most national laws on AML and CTF. After the terrorist attacks in the U.S. on 
September 11, 2001, the FATF expanded its mandate to incorporate efforts to 
combat terrorist financing by issuing an additional Nine Special 
Recommendations. (Hopton 2009, 19; FATF 2015.) 
Since the FATF Recommendations were created in 1990, they have been 
adopted by over 190 countries. They are revised periodically, most recently in 
2012, to make sure they are up to date and respond to current threaths to the 
financial system. In the most recent update of the Recommendations, the risk-
based approach is emphasized more than in the previous versions. The risks 
are not the same for every country; however, the risk-based approach enables 
countries to devote their resources to the areas where the risks are the highest. 
(FATF 2015, 6.) Also, countries have diverse legal, administrative and 
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operational frameworks as well as different financial systems, and therefore 
they cannot all take the exact same measures to counter the threats. Thus the 
FATF Recommendations set an international standard which different countries 
need to apply through measures that are suitable for their unique 
circumstances. (FATF 2013, 7.) The FATF works in close co-operation with 
FATF-style regional bodies and the observer organizations, including e.g. the 
International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the United Nations (UN). The 
FATF also maintains an active dialogue with the private sector and civil society. 
Thus the revised Recommendations has involved extensive consultation from 
these stakeholders. (FATF 2013, 8-9.) 
The FATF Forty Recommendations are divided under the following 7 titles: 
A. AML/CTF policies and coordination 
B. Money laundering and confiscation 
C. Terrorist financing and financing of proliferation 
D. Preventive measures 
E. Transparency and beneficial ownership of legal persons and 
arrangements 
F. Powers and responsibilities of competent authorities, and other 
institutional measures 
G. International Cooperation 
(FATF 2013, 11-30.) 
By publishing monitoring reports, the FATF assesses the member countries’ 
legislation and the actions taken by public authorities against the 
Recommendations. Also, as stated earlier, the FATF peridiocally identifies 
juridictions that have strategic deficiencies in AML and/or CTF measures. 
(Sisäministeriö 2015.) 
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3.2 The EU Directive and Regulation 
The EU rules in the area of combating money laundering and financing of 
terrorism are largely based on international standards created by the FATF. 
They are tailored to the EU’s needs and complemented by national provisions. 
(European Commission 2015.) The following provisions are in force in the EU: 
 Directive (EU) 2015/849 on preventing the use of the financial system for 
money laundering or terrorist financing (4th Anti-Money Laundering 
Directive) 
 Regulation (EU) 2015/847 on information on the payer accompanying 
transfers of funds 
The EU Directive 2015/849 seeks to protect credit and financial institutions 
against the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing, whereas the EU 
Regulation 2015/847 is aimed to make fund transfers more transparent. 
(European Commission 2015.) The EU Directive 2015/849 came into force on 
20 May 2015, “amending Regulation (EU) No 648/2012 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council, and repealing Directive 2005/60/EC of the 
European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directive 
2006/70/EC” (European Union 2015). According to the Directive (EU) 2015/849,  
Article 67: “Member States shall bring into force the laws, regulations and 
administrative provisions necessary to comply with this Directive by 26 June 
2017. They shall immediately communicate the text of those measures to the 
Commission.” 
The Directive primaly applies to the financial sector including banks, 
accountants, trust or company service providers, accountants and lawyers. 
Also, any other kinds of businesses involved in making or receiving cash 
payments for goods worth at least 10.000€ have to comply with the rules, 
regardless of whether payment is made in single or more linked transactions. 
(Out-Law 2015; Chave et al. 2015, 1-2.) 
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The key Directive requirements are Customer Due Diligence, record-keeping, 
suspicious-transaction reporting and internal controls. The previous Directive 
had the same elements; however, the 4th Directive brought some changes to 
the previous one. The new regime brought into force new Customer Due 
Diligence checking requirements: Simplified Due Diligence was made more 
complex whereas Enhanced Due Diligence now applies also to domestic 
Politically Exposed Persons (PEPs) (Chave et al. 2015, 2). I will better introduce 
these concepts later on. An other important change is that all member states 
will need to introduce an “ultimate beneficial owner” register, where officials 
have an access to. Central registers will enable greater transparency in financial 
transitions. (Out-Law 2015.) The new Directive increases senior managers’ 
responsibilities in recognizing money laundering attempts. Also, sanctions for 
non-compliance will increase significantly. (Chave et al. 2015, 2.) 
The Regulation (EU) 2015/847, then again, is binding in its entirety and is 
directly applicable to all Member Sates. The Regulation will apply from 26 June 
2017. (Regulation (EU) 2015/847 of the European parliament and of the council, 
Article 27.) The previous regulation on information on the payer accompanying 
transfers of funds 1781/2006 will be repealed. 
The Regulation seeks to improve the traceability of payments and information 
on the payer and the payee in order to detect money laundering and terrorist 
financing. In short, it can be said that the Regulation applies if there is at least 
one payment service provider (PSP) involved in the transfer, which is 
established in the Union. The PSP of the payer needs to ensure that transfers 
of funds are accompanied by the following information on the payer: the name 
of the payer, the payer’s payment account number, and the payer’s address, 
official personal document number, customer identification number or date and 
place of birth. Also, the PSP of the payer needs to ensure that transfers of funds 
are accompanied by the following information on the payee: the name of the 
payee, and the payee’s payment account number. The information on the payer 
and the payee has to be retained for 5 years after the transfer of funds. (OPF-
Partners 2015.) There are some exception to the Regulation, as well as other 
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important points to complying with it but I won’t go into further details about 
them. 
Finland will have to adjust its laws and regulations to comply with the new 
Directive and the Regulation by 26 June 2017. At the moment, the Finnish AML 
legislation complies with the previous EU Directive. The parties that the 
Directive and the Regulation applies to should start preparing themselves well 
in advance so that their operations are up to date when the Directive and the 
Regulation are actually implemented into Finnish legislation. 
3.3 Legislation in Finland 
In Finland, money laundering became a punishable offence in 1994. Before the 
EU provisions on money laundering came into force, there had been no uniform 
legislation in Finland to prevent and investigate money laundering. (European 
Commission 2006; Poliisi n.d..) The criminal sentence depends on whether the 
perpetrator has himself committed the predicate offence or has only got 
involved in the money laundering. In Finland, the predicate offence may be any 
committed crime, as long as it has brought economic benefit to the perpetrator. 
If the money launderer has himself committed the predicate offence, he will only 
be punished for that crime. If the person has not been involved in committing 
the predicate offence, but has only been involved in the money laundering, he 
will be sentenced for money laundering under sections 6-10 of the Criminal 
Code of Finland (Poliisi n.d.). 
However, if a person has himself committed the predicate offence, he may still 
be sentenced for aggravated money laundering if “the money laundering 
offence, with consideration to the continuous and planned nature of the acts 
forms the most essential and blameworthy part of the totality of offences” (the 
Criminal Code of Finland 39/1889, Section 11). This is because in some cases 
the punishment for money laundering is tougher than the punishment for the 
predicate offence would be. Thus this provision prevents criminals from 
“tricking” with the punishments. 
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3.3.1 Money laundering as a criminal offence 
The Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889, Section 6) defines the crime of money 
laundering as following: 
(1) A person who 
1. receives, uses, converts, conveys, transfers or transmits or possesses 
property acquired through an offence, the proceeds of crime or property 
replacing such property in order to obtain benefit for himself or herself or 
for another or to conceal or obliterate the illegal origin of such proceeds 
or property in order to assist the offender in evading the legal 
consequences of the offece or 
2. conceals or obliterates the true nature, origin, location or disposition of, 
or rights to, property acquired through an offence, the proceeds of an 
offence or property replacing such property or assists another in such 
concealment or obliteration, 
shall be sentenced for money laundering to a fine or to imprisonment for at most 
two years. 
(2) An attempt is punishable. 
(Criminal Code of Finland 39/1889). 
In the Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889, Chaper 32 Sections 6-10), money 
laundering is divided into following sections: money laundering, aggravated 
money laundering, conspiracy for the commission of aggravated money 
laundering, negligent money laundering and money laundering violation. Money 
laundering is considered to be aggravated if the property acquired through the 
offence has been very valuable or the crime is committed in a particularly 
intentional manner. In the case of aggravated money laundering, the offender 
shall be sentenced to imprisonment for at least four months and at most six 
years. Here an attempt is also punishable. A person can be sentenced for 
conspiracy for the commission of aggravated money laundering if he or she 
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agrees with another on the commission of aggravated money laundering 
directed at the proceeds of the giving of a bribe, the acceptance of a bribe, or 
aggravated tax fraud or aggravated subsidy fraud directed at the tax, or at 
property replacing such proceeds. The sentence for this offence is a fine or an 
imprisonment of at most one year. Then again, a person who through gross 
negligence launders money, shall be sentenced for negligent money laundering 
to a fine or to imprisonment for at most two years. Lastly, if the money 
laundering or the negligent money laundering is petty when assessed as a 
whole, the offender shall be sentenced for a money laundering violation to only 
a fine. (Criminal Code of Finland 39/1889 Sections 6-10; Talousrikos n.d..) 
3.3.2 Confiscation 
Organized crime activities are mostly profit driven. The confiscation of the 
proceeds of crime deprive criminals of what they have worked hard to acquire. 
Confiscation has a deterrent effect as it prevents criminals from benefiting from 
the proceeds of crime. When the criminal forfeits the illicit funds, he/she may not 
use them to finance new crimes. It is said that when the criminal forfeits the 
economic benefit gained from the crime, it will decrease his/her motivation to 
commit new crimes. (Sahavirta 2008, 363 – 365; European Commission 2015.)  
In the Criminal Code of Finland, it is stated that the property that has been the 
target of money laundering, aggravated money laundering or negligent money 
laundering, shall be ordered forfeit to the State. However, the property that is 
the target of the offence may, instead of being ordered forfeit to the State, be 
ordered as compensation or restitution to the person injured by the predicate 
offence, if the nature of the property is suitable for this, and compensation or 
restitution has not already been paid to him or her. If the nature of the property 
is not suitable to be paid as compensation to the injured person, it shall be 
ordered forfeit, and the injured person has the right to receive a comparable 
amount as compensation or restitution from the State funds. (Criminal Code of 
Finland 39/1889, Section 12.) 
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According to European Commission, the current number of freezing and 
confiscation procedures in the EU and the amount of proceeds recovered from 
organised crime seem modest if compared to the estimated revenues of these 
criminals. (European Commission 2015). Therefore it is important to enchance 
the international cooperation in tracing criminal assets, so that they can be 
ordered forfeit. 
3.3.3 Anti-money laundering legislation in Finland 
The Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing, the so called AML Act, became effective on 1 August 2008. The Act 
is supplemented by Government Decrees 616/2008 and 1204/2011, Decision 
by the Ministry of the Interior 156/2010 and Government Decision 1022/2010. 
The AML Act based on the EU’s Third Anti-Money Laundering Directive. 
(Financial Supervisory Authority 2014.) The purpose of the AML Act is to 
prevent money laundering and terrorist financing, to promote the detection and 
investigation of them and to reinforce the tracing and recovery of the proceeds 
of crime. Shortly, the AML Act applies to banks, advocates, investment firms, 
management companies, insurance companies, gaming operators, auditors, 
and businesses or professions dealing in goods to the extent that payments are 
made in cash in an amount of 15.000 euros or more. (Act on Detecting and 
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Sections 1-2.) 
The new EU Directive that was discussed earlier will lower that amount to 
10.000 euros. The AML Act also applies to branches of foreign credit 
institutions, insurance companies, investment firms etc. 
The key principles of the AML Act are Customer Due Diligence and a risk-based 
approach to money laundering and terrorist financing. CDD means the 
procedures related to customer identification, knowing one’s customer, and 
ongoing monitoring. CDD enables the service provider to ascertain the real 
identity of the customer and to have an adequate knowledge of the customer’s 
business. A risk-based assessment means that service providers have internal 
operational methods and processes in place, adequate with the nature and size 
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of their operations, for assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist 
financing related to their customers, services and products. Service providers 
need to review their customer relationships, services, products and distribution 
channels, and assess whether CDD measures are as adequate as required in 
the law. If necessary, service providers have to update their previous 
information on customers. The Act requires the parties subject to the reporting 
obligation, for example, to identify the beneficial owner and to clarify corporate 
customers’ ownership structures: the natural persons whose ownership of 
holdings or controlling interests exceeds 25% need to be identified. (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2011.) 
If there is a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, the risk-based 
approach requires particular care in measures taken for CDD. This enhanced 
Customer Due Diligence means obtaining more information on the customer’s 
business and closer monitoring of the relationship than normally. On the other 
hand, if there is a lower risk of money laundering and terrorist financing, the 
measures taken for customer due diligence may be more limited. This is 
procedure is called a simplified Customer Due Diligence. (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2011.) 
The AML Act imposes an obligation on above mentioned service providers to 
monitor customer relationships, use of services and transactions on a regular 
basis throughout the existence of the customer relationship (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2011). According to the Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (503/2008, Section 9) “Parties 
subject to the reporting obligation shall pay particular attention to transactions 
which are unusual in respect of their structure or extent or the size or office of 
the parties subject to the reporting obligation. The same also applies if 
transactions have no apparent economic purpose or if they are inconsistent with 
the parties’ experience or knowledge of the customers. If necessary, measures 
shall be taken to establish the source of funds that are involved in a 
transaction.” For example, if a customer wishes to deposit a large sum of cash 
to his/her account, he/she may be asked for a document to prove the origin of 
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that cash money. If suspicions are to arise, parties subject to the reporting 
obligation shall immediately report a suspicious transaction or a suspicion of 
terrorist financing to the Financial Intelligence Unit. Parties subject to the 
reporting obligation shall suspend a transaction for further inquiries or refuse to 
conduct a transaction if the transaction is either suspicious or they suspect that 
the funds involved in the transaction are used for terrorist financing or a 
punishable attempt to finance terrorism. (The Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Sections 23-26.) 
According to the Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing (503/2008, Section 40), anyone who deliberately or through 
negligence fails to fulfil the obligation to conduct CDD, or the obligation to keep 
records of the CDD data, shall be sentenced for violation of customer due 
diligence to a fine. 
The Ministry of Finance set up a working group in December 2014 to prepare a 
prosal for a new AML Act that complies with the EU’s fourth Anti-Money 
Laundering Directive and the FATF’s 40 Recommendations. One of the goals 
for the working group is also to assess the penalty system and the supervisory 
structures of money laundering and terrorist financing. (Krp 2014, 4.) 
3.3.4 The acts and decrees that are in force in Finland 
In Finland, the Ministry of the Interior is responsible for the development of AML 
legislation. Some of the acts and decrees are available only in Finnish and in 
Swedish. The following acts and decrees are currently in force in Finland: 
 Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing (503/2008) 
 Government Decree on Preventing and Clearing Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing (616/2008) 
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 Government Decree on simplified customer due diligence related to 
certain financial contracts in the prevention and detection of money 
laundering and terrorist financing (1204/2011) 
 Ministry of the Interior Decision on non-EEA states and territories whose 
provisions on preventing and detecting money laundering and terrorist 
financing meet the requirements laid down in the Act on Preventing and 
Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing (156/2012) 
 Government Decision on states and territories whose provisions on 
preventing and detecting money laundering and terrorist financing do not 
comply with the international requirements laid down in the Act on 
Preventing and Detecting Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
(1022/2010) 
 The Criminal Code (39/1889) 
 Chapter 32 (Receiving and money laundering offences) 
 Chapter 34 a (Terrorist offences) 
 Chapter 46 (Regulation offences and smuggling) 
 Credit Institutions Act, section 145 (121/2007) 
 Investment Firms Act, section 69 (922/2007) 
 Act on amendment of section 144 on Mutual Funds Act (507/2008) 
 Act on the Book Entry System, section 29 b (826/1991) 
 Act on Payment Institutions, section 39 (297/2010) 
 Decree by the Ministry of Finance on information to be attached to 
authorisation applications by credit institutions, section 16 (939/2007) 
 Decree by the Ministry of Finance on information to be attached to 
authorisation applications by investment firms, section 12 (937/2007) 
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 Decree by the Ministry of Finance on information to be attached to 
authorisation applications by fund management companies and 
custodians, section 12 (938/2007) 
 Ministry of Finance Decree on the information to be appended to the 
authorisation application of a payment institution (554/2011) (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2012.) 
3.4 The Financial Intelligence Unit 
In Finland, the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) operating under the National 
Bureau of Investigation deals with reports submitted to them on suspicious 
transactions (Financial Supervisory Authority 2014). The FIU was established in 
1998 (Poliisi n.d.). According to the Act on Detecting and Preventing Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing (503/2008, Section 35) the duties of the FIU 
are following: 
 detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing by 
receiving, recording and examining reports on suspicions of money 
laundering and terrorist financing as well as investigating crimes that 
were committed to gain the proceeds of crime subject to money 
laundering and terrorist financing 
 promoting cooperation between authorities in the fight against money 
laundering and terrorist financing 
 cooperation and exchange of information with the authorities of a foreign 
state and international organizations that are responsible for detecting 
and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing 
 cooperation with the parties subject to the reporting obligation 
 giving feedback on the effects of submitted reports 
 keeping statistics on the number of reports received and the number of 
transactions suspended 
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The National Bureau of Investigation is also obliged to provide the National 
Police Board with an annual report on the activities of the FIU and the progress 
of AML and CTF actions in Finland in general. (Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 35; Poliisi n.d..) 
The operations of the FIU are divided into three divisions. The division that 
receives reports on suspicious transactions analyzes and registers them. The 
investigations division then carries out an initial investigation and determines 
whether a pre-trial investigation needs to be conducted. The division of 
international affairs, then again, takes care of international inquiries and 
contacts, and deals with the CTF issues. (Poliisi n.d..) 
Parties subject to the reporting obligation have to report a suspicious 
transaction or a suspicion of terrorist financing to the FIU via online reporting 
system. The link to the system can be found on the webpage of the National 
Bureau of Investigation. Both organization representatives and individual 
persons have to register themselves into the system before they are able to 
report a suspicion (Poliisi n.d.).  
3.5 The Financial Supervisory Authority 
The Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority (FIN-FSA) supervises Finland’s 
financial and insurance sectors. The entitites supervised by the FIN-FSA 
include banks, insurance and pension companies as well as other companies 
operating in the insurance sector, fund management companies, investment 
firms and the Helsinki stock exchange. 95% of the activities of the FIN-FSA is 
funded by the supervised entitites and the remainder is provided by the Bank of 
Finland. Although FIN-FSA operates in connection with the Bank of Finland, it 
makes independent decisions in their supervisory work. (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2015.) 
When it comes to combating money laundering and terrorist financing, the FIN-
FSA is responsible for ensuring that the procedures, risk management and 
internal control of supervised entities meet the statutory requirements. If a 
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supervised entity or its employee fails to comply with the obligations of 
customer due diligence, they may be sentenced to a punishment. A supervised 
entity may become guilty of negligent money laundering if it assists or counsels 
a customer in connection with, for example, investment activities or transfer of 
funds, although there are weighty reasons to be suspicious of the customer’s 
business. (Financial Supervisory Authority 2014.) The administrative sanctions 
and supervisory measures exercised by the FIN-FSA are following: a temporary 
prohibition from holding a managerial position in a supervised entity, a 
curtailment of operations subject to authorization, administrative fines, public 
warnings, and penalty payments. The harshest punishment for non-compliance 
with the obligations is the penalty payment. The size of the penalty payment is 
based on a comprehensive assessment: consideration is given, for example, to 
the nature, scope and duration of the breach. The maximum penalty for a legal 
person - a business entity - is 10% of the consolidated financial statements, 
while that for a natural person is 5 million euros. (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2015.) 
In May 2015, Sweden’s Financial Supervisory Authority fined banking groups 
Nordea and Handelsbanken for non-compliance with the AML and CTF 
legislation. Nordea, the Nordic region’s biggest financial services group, was 
fined 50 million SEK, which is approximately 5,4 million euros, for having major 
deficiencies in its approach to tackling money laundering. According to the FSA, 
Nordea had lacked an effective system to detect and prevent money laundering 
for several years, whether identifying high-risk individuals, suspicious 
transactions and counterparts in tax havens or countries linked to terrorism. The 
severity of the non-compliance would have even justified revoking Nordea’s 
banking license, but because Nordea had already taken measures to address 
the problems, the FSA only issued a warning alongside the fine. 
Handelsbanken, then again, was fined 35 million SEK, which is approximately 
3,7 million euros. Handelsbanken got only a remark, which is a less serious 
official sanction than a warning. (Reuters 2015; Kervinen 2015.) After getting 
fines this big, the banks probably don’t want to risk their businesses anymore by 
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having deficiencies in their measures to combat money laundering and terrorist 
financing. 
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4 THE ROLE OF A BANK 
In this chapter, the Finnish AML Act that was discussed in chapter 3.3.3 is 
looked more deeply into. Banks in Finland are obliged by the Act on Detecting 
and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing to know their 
customers, monitor their customer relationships and customers’ transactions, 
and to report suspicious transactions to the Financial Intelligence Unit. Banks 
must have such risk management procedures in place that are commensurate 
with the nature and size of their business. In this chapter, I will go through the 
key principles of the AML Act that affect the operations of banks. 
I interviewed the service manager of a bank in Finland to get an insight how the 
law is applied in practice. He wished that I would not mention the name of the 
bank, and therefore I will refer to ”Bank X”. When talking about the service 
manager, I will refer to ”Mr Y”. The interview questions were sent to the service 
manager one week prior to the interview. The interview was conducted in 
Finnish, and thus the questions sent beforehand are in Finnish. They can be 
found in the Appendix 1. The questions go hand in hand with the Finnish AML 
Act: I first introduce a law section and then get a practical view by deploying the 
interview answers. I first tried to get an interview from the bank where I worked 
in the summer, but they did not agree to give any information. Therefore I 
approached the service manager of Bank X. He’s an expert in the AML field and 
has a vast knowledge on complying with the AML law. Unfortunately he was not 
allowed to give very detailed information to be published, though. Gaining 
primary qualitative data for this thesis was thus a challenge, in deed. In addition 
to the interview, I reflect my own observations from my experience working as a 
cashier service officer. My own observation are part of the empirical part. 
Note: The AML Act applies to all ”parties subject to the reporting obligation”, 
such as insurance companies and auditors, but in this chapter I will only refer to 
banks. 
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4.1 Risk based approach 
As said, banks need to have in place such risk management procedures related 
to money laundering and terrorist financing that are commensurate with the size 
and nature of their operations. When assessing the risks of money laundering 
and terrorist financing, banks have to take into account the risks that are related 
to their sector, products, services, customers, the customers’ business and 
transactions, as well as to technological development. The CDD measures 
need to be observed on the basis of risk-based assessment throughout the 
existence of the customer relationship. Banks need to show the Financial 
Supervisory Authority that their methods for CDD and ongoing monitoring are 
adequate and comply with the AML Act. (Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 6.) The risk 
assessment can be used for classifying the customers into different groups 
based on the level of risk they present. Risk assessment needs to be reviewed 
on a regular basis and updated when necessary. (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2010, 14-16.) 
I asked Mr Y what kind of risk assessment Bank X uses, but he could not give 
an exact answer. He said that Bank X ”acts according to the recommendations 
given by the Federation of Finnish Financial Services”, and that “Bank X does 
its risk assessment based on those recommendations”. He said that risk 
assessment involves both technology and people. When I asked what kind of 
risk categories customers are divided into, Mr Y could not answer at all. (Mr Y, 
interview 11.11.2015.) 
According to the Financial Supervisory Authority (2010, 16), banks’ should have 
effective risk management systems in place. Bank X belongs to a financial 
group, and the risk management guidelines come from the group level. The 
group that Bank X belongs to has a risk management department including a 
compliace unit. They give the instructions to the banks belonging to the group. 
Bank X acts according to these instructions. However, Bank X has also a risk 
management unit of its own. The compliance with the agreed principles is 
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ensured by internal control and supervisory. The compliance is also 
documented. (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) 
4.2 CDD - Customer Due Diligence 
CDD obliges banks to know their customers. According to the AML Act, banks 
need to identify their customers and verify their identities in certain situations. 
Identification means establishing the customer’s identity on the basis of 
information provided by the customer; whereas verification of the identity means 
ascertaining the customer’s identity on the basis of documents, data or 
information obtained from a reliable and independent source. According to the 
AML Act, banks need to identify the customer and verify the customer’s identity 
when: 
 establishing regular customer relationships; 
 in case of suspicious transaction or if they have a suspicion that the 
funds involved are used for terrorist financing; 
 when they have doubts about the reliability of previously obtained data 
on the customer’s identity; 
 if someone acts on the behalf of the customer, the representative must 
be identified, and his/her identity must be verified if necessary; 
 when the sum of a transaction is 15,000€ or more, regardless of whether 
payment is made in single or more linked transactions, and when the 
customer relationship is not regular. (Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Sections 5 - 7; 
Financial Supervisory Auhtority 2010, 18-19.) 
However, banks are obliged by the Payer Information Regulation (1781/2006) to 
identify and verify the customer’s identity when the amount of the transfer of 
funds, that is conducted in cash, exceeds 1000€ (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2010, 19). This means that if a customer wishes to deposit 1000€ in 
cash even into his/her own bank account, he/she must be identified (Financial 
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Supervisory Authority 2010, 35). Banks may apply stricter internal instructions, 
too. For example, when I worked as a cashier service officer in the summer of 
2015 in a bank, we always verified the customer’s identity, even if they 
deposited less than 1000€ to their account. Also, if they wanted to pay invoices 
in cash, no matter what the amount of funds involved was, we always verified 
the customer’s identity. The Payer Information Regulation obliges banks to 
make sure that transfers of funds are accompanied by the following information 
on the payer: the name of the payer, the payer’s payment account number, and 
the payer’s address, official personal document number, customer identification 
number or date and place of birth. The aim of the regulation is to ensure that 
officials are able to trace suspicious transfers. (Financial Supervisory Authority 
2010, 35.) The new EU regulation on information on the payer accompanying 
transfers of funds (2015/847), which was introduced in chapter 3.2, will apply 
from 26 June 2017, repealing the previous regulation (1781/2006). (Regulation 
(EU) 2015/847 on information on the payer accompanying transfers of funds, 
Article 26.) 
When the customer is present in person, his/her identity needs to verified on the 
basis of an official document. The identity documents that are considered 
reliable for banking purposes in Finland, providing that they are in force and 
issued by a Finnish authority, are: 
 Passport 
 Identity card (also temporary) 
 Driving licence 
 Photo-bearing identity card issued by the Social Insurance Institution of 
Finland  
 Alien’s passport 
 Diplomatic passport 
 Refugee’s travel document 
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Then again, valid passport is the only foreign-issued document accepted as a 
reliable proof of identity. However, identification cards used in the EU and EEA 
as travel documents may also be accepted as proof of identity at banks if their 
authenticity can be verified. (Federation on Finnish Financial Services n.d..) 
However, on the basis of its own risk management principles, the bank may 
decide which documents to accept for verification purposes. In the case where 
the customer relationship is established without having the customer physically 
present, for example in an online service, the customer's identity can be verified 
by, for example, using an electronic identification device that fulfils the criteria of 
strong electronic identification device, such as an online banking code or a 
mobile certificate. (Financial Supervisory Authority 2015.) 
Banks also need to identify the beneficial owners, and if necessary, verify their 
identity (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing, Section 8). Beneficial owner means a natural person on whose 
behalf the transaction is being conducted, or if the customer is e.g. a company, 
it means the natural person who controls the company. A natural person is 
deemed to exercise control when his/her ownership of holdings or controlling 
interests exceeds 25%. (Financial Supervisory Authority 2011.) However, 
according to the AML Act, there are situations where beneficial owners do not 
have to be identified. An example of that kind of situation is when the customer 
is a company or corporation whose securities are admitted to public trading 
referred to in the Securities Markets Act or to similar trading in another EEA 
State. There are also other situations where the beneficial owner does not have 
to be identified but I won’t go into further detail about them. 
By identifying the customer it is meant that banks must have sufficient 
information on their customers’ activities, financial status, banking practices, 
and purpose for which the services are used. Banks need to find out what kind 
of services their customers need. Furthermore, the law requires banks to ask 
where their customers’ incoming money comes from and what the money is 
going to be used for. A bank can for example request a written clarification from 
its customer on the origin of funds paid to the customer’s account. Also, if a 
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customer wishes to deposit what a bank considers to be a large amount of cash 
into his/her account, he/she may be asked for a document that proves the origin 
of that money, such as a bill of sale. (Federation of Finnish Financial Services 
n.d.; Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 503/2008, Section 9; Financial Supervisory Authority 2015.) These 
questions may irritate customers as they are perceived as too personal. Thus it 
is important to tell the customers that the bank has the statutory obligation to 
know their customers. On the other hand, customers are used to answer 
questions concerning their personal expenditure and income as banks need this 
information to make mortgage decisions. However, questions concerning the 
customer’s political influence may cause bewilderment among customers. 
(Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2015.) 
I asked Mr Y what kind of questions are asked in Bank X when establishing a 
new customer relationship. According to him, no matter whether the customer is 
a personal customer or a corporate customer, all the information that is required 
by the law for CDD is asked. “When it comes to personal customers, it is a bit 
more simple. When establishing a customer relationship with a corporation, we 
have to find out the business structure and type, as well as the company 
background. Then we get to the point where we have to identify the beneficial 
owner” (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015). Basic information is updated in every 
customer meeting, regardless of the channel (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015). 
According to Uusi Suomi (2015), customers have been disconcerted by the 
detailed questions that banks have been asking them. I asked Mr Y how the 
customers of Bank X react to the questions about their incoming money, 
political influence and so on. He said that they take the questions mainly well, 
although there are some exceptions. “In my opinion, it has changed during the 
past half year. It has been talked about a lot recently and thus the customers’ 
attitude has changed.” Mr Y stated that there used to be customers who didn’t 
quite understand the reasoning behind the questions and got irritated, but 
nowadays that kind of behavior has basically disappeared. The customers are 
always told why the bank asks such questions. The Bank X has also a written 
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document that they can hand out to the customer in case he/she wishes to see 
some facts why such questions are asked. (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) 
Finland and the US have agreed on information exchange subject to FATCA, 
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act concerning the taxation of U.S. foreign 
accounts. Due to the agreement, banks must yearly recognize the accounts and 
assets of U.S. persons and report their number and amount of assets to Finnish 
Tax Administration. Finnish Tax Administartion will then report the information 
further to the U.S. tax authority, the Internal Revenue Service. (Verohallinto 
2015.) The aim of the FATCA agreement is to prevent tax evasion of U.S. 
citizens (Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2014). That’s why banks’ 
customers are also asked if they have connections to the U.S.. 
4.3 CDD data and record keeping 
Banks have to document the customer identification and due diligence 
information. Records have to be retained in a secure manner for five years 
following the end of regular customer relationship. When the transaction is 
occasional amounting to over 15,000€, the records need to be kept for five 
years following the carrying-out of the transaction. The following information 
must be retained: 
 name, date of birth and personal identity number 
 name, date of birth and personal identity number for someone acting as 
a representative 
 full name, register number, register date and registering authority for a 
legal person 
 full name, date of birth and nationality of the member of the board or an 
equivalent decision-making body of a legal person 
 business sector of the legal person 
 name, date of birth and personal identity number of beneficial owner 
51 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Heta Kuustie 
 name, number or other identifier and issuer of the document used in the 
verification of identity, or a copy of the document 
 the information that is necessary to conduct customer due diligence, 
such as information on the customer's transactions, the nature and 
extent of the customer’s business, his/her financial status, the grounds 
for the use of transactions or services and information on the source of 
funds 
If the customer is a foreigner without a Finnish identity code, records need to be 
retained of the customer’s citizenship and travel document in addition to the 
above mentioned data. (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laudering and 
Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 10; Financial Supervisory Authority 
2015.) 
The above mentioned data has to be retained so that banks can later, if 
necessary, demonstrate to officials how each customer has been identified, 
which document was used for verifying the customer’s identity and who 
conducted the CDD measures. The customer has the right to access his/her 
identification information. However, banks may not disclose the making of a 
suspicious transaction report to the customer subject to the suspicion. Thus the 
data necessary to fulfil the reporting obligation has to be kept separate from the 
customer register. Customers don’t have an access to this information. 
(Financial Supervisory Authority 2010, 33.) 
4.4 Enhanced vs. Simplified CDD 
According to the AML Act, banks must apply enhanced CDD measures in 
situations where the customer, service, product, or transaction represents a 
higher risk of money laundering or terrorist financing, or where the customer or 
the transaction is connected with a state whose system of detecting and 
preventing money laundering and terrorist financing doesn’t meet the 
international standards. (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering 
and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 17.) In practice, enhanced CDD 
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means that the documentation of the customer’s transactions needs to be done 
even more carefully, and the customers who are subject to enhanced CDD 
measures need to be observed more carefully in ongoing monitoring. Banks 
have to apply enhanced CDD measures to customers who are in connection 
with high-risk countries. By connection it is meant, for example, that the 
customer’s home country is one of the high-risk countries, or that he/she does 
business with a company from one these countries. (Financial Supervisory 
Authority 2010, 27.) Different bodies identify countries that have strategic 
deficiencies in their AML/CTF procedures. As discussed earlier, the FATF and 
the Basel Institute on Governance are examples of those who list high-risk 
jurisdictions. I asked Mr Y whether he knew whose listing Bank X uses. 
According to him, Bank X uses the so called FATCA list but he didn’t know who 
has drawn it up. (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) 
If the customer is not physically present when he/she is identified and his/her 
identity is verified, banks need to take additional measures to reduce the risk of 
money laundering and terrorist financing. They can, for example, verify the 
customer’s identity on the basis of additional documents obtained from a 
reliable source, or verify his/her identity by means of verifiable electronic 
identification, such as an online banking code. (Act on Detecting and Preventing 
Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 18; Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2010, 28.) 
Enhanced CDD measures must be applied also when the bank concludes a 
contract on the handling of payments and other assignments with a credit 
institution located in a country outside the EEA. In this case, the bank has to 
obtain sufficient information about the respondent institution before concluding 
the contract. For example, the bank has to assess the respondent credit 
institution’s reputation and its AML and CTF measures. Also, if the respondent 
credit institution is subject to the UN’s or the EU’s financial sanctions, the bank 
can not start a correspondent banking relationship with it. (Act on Detecting and 
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 19; 
Financial Supervisory Authority 2010, 29.) The bank can neither start a banking 
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relationship with a so called shell bank that is located in a tax haven (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2010, 29). 
When obtaining information about customers, the bank has to determine 
whether the customer is holding, or has held, an important public position in 
another state. This is related to enhanced CDD, because it is considered that 
politically exposed persons (PEPs) are prone to corruption, and thus bear 
higher risk of becoming involved in money laundering. Enhanced CDD applies 
to the PEP’s family members and close associates, too. Positions that are 
considered to be prominent public functions are held by presidents, ministers, 
ambassadors, etc.. (Krp 2012, 34-35.) As there is no register of PEPs, banks 
are forced to ask their customers whether they are politically exposed. This is 
perceived as awkward among both the customers and the bank employees. 
(Federation of Finnish Financial Services 2013.) However, it might be rather 
difficult to maintain such register, as “a person is no longer considered a 
politically exposed person when he or she has not held an important public 
position for at least one year” (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money 
Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 20). Thus the list of 
PEPs would be changing all the time. The register would also have to include 
PEPs’ family members which would increase the difficulty to create such 
register. As said, the customer is considered as a PEP only if he/she is holding, 
or has held, an important position in another state. However, the EU’s 4th AML 
Directive brought into force new customer due diligence checking requirements 
where enhanced CDD will apply also to domestic PEPs. The new directive has 
to be implemented into Finnish legislation by 26 June 2017 (EU Directive 
2015/849, Section 67).  
In case it is determined that a customer is a PEP, the senior management of the 
bank has to give its approval for establishing a customer relationship with such 
person. Also, the bank needs to establish the source of wealth and funds that 
are involved in that customer relationship or transaction. Enhanced ongoing 
monitoring of the customer relationship needs to be conducted, too. (Act on 
Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008.) 
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Whereas enhanced CDD measures need to be applied when the customer or 
the transaction represents a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist 
financing, simplified CDD measures can be applied when the customer, 
product, or transaction represents a low risk of money laundering and terrorist 
financing. Simplified CDD measures can be applied if the customer is e.g. a 
Finnish authority; a credit institution, a financial institution, or an investment firm 
that is duly authorised in Finland or in another EEA State. Simplified CDD 
measures may also be applied if one of the above-mentioned is located in a 
non-EEA State that is subject to the obligations equivalent to those in the 
Finnish AML Act. The bank may also apply simplified CDD measures if the 
customer is a company whose securities are admitted to public trading. (Act on 
Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, 
Sections 13-14.) By products that represent a low risk of money laundering it is 
meant certain insurance products (Financial Supervisory Authority 2010, 31-32). 
In practice, applying simplified CDD measures means that the bank doesn’t 
have to identify the beneficial owner and doesn’t have to clarify the company 
structure. Neither do the bank have to obtain the amount of information that it 
would normally have to. However, the identity of the company repsentative must 
still be identified. Also, despite applying simplified CDD measures, the bank 
must still monitor the customer relationship in order to detect any exceptional or 
unusual patterns of transactions. (Krp 2012, 29-30.) It can be said that 
simplified CDD measures can not be applied to “normal customers” even if they 
don’t represent necessarily a higher risk of money laundering or terrorist 
financing. 
4.5 Ongoing monitoring 
According to the AML Act, banks are obliged to arrange monitoring that is 
adequate in the view of the nature, extent and risks of the customers’ 
transactions to ensure that the transactions are consistent with the banks’ 
experience or knowledge of the customers and their business. Banks must pay 
particular attention to transactions which are unusual in respect of their 
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structure, quantity or size. The same also applies if transactions have no 
apparent economic purpose or if they are inconsistent with the banks’ 
experience or knowledge of the customers. If necessary, measures need to be 
taken to establish the source of funds that are involved in the unusual 
transaction. (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist 
Financing 503/2008, Section 9.) 
Banks need to have enough resources to arrange ongoing monitoring. They 
should also have in place internal instructions for using the monitoring system. 
As the AML Act applies to a variety of businesses, there is no definite 
requirements for monitoring systems. Thus each bank may have a different type 
of monitoring system. The monitoring system may be automated or manual, or 
a combination of these two, as long as it is adequate for meeting the 
requirements of detecting unusual transactions. (Financial Supervisory Authority 
2010, 34.) 
I asked Mr Y how Bank X has organized ongoing monitoring and how they 
detect unusual transactions. He could not give an exact answer as he only 
stated that they “react to deviations regardless of the channel”. As said, the 
process involves both technology and people. I also asked Mr Y how the 
customers react when they wish to deposit cash to their bank account and are 
asked about the origin of the funds. He stated that in this case, when compared 
to asking CDD questions, there are more of those customers who become 
irritated. According to Mr Y, it is kind of a primitive reaction: the customer may 
feel like he/she is suspected of something or that he/she is not trusted. 
However, most customers react positively when they are asked about the origin 
of their funds, and they understand why those questions are asked. (Mr Y, 
interview 11.11.2015.) An “origin of the funds” –document, which customers are 
asked to fill out, is commonly used in many banks. 
I asked Mr Y how deposits at ATMs are regulated and monitored. He stated that 
the maximum single deposit is 5,000€, and again, deviations are reacted to 
regardless of the channel. (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) 
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4.6 Reporting obligation and suspension of a transaction 
Having fulfilled the obligation to obtain information, banks must immediately 
report a suspicious transaction or a suspicion of terrorist financing to the FIU. 
Banks are obliged to give the FIU, free of charge, all the necessary information 
and documents that could be significant in clearing the suspicion. (Act on 
Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, 
Section 23.) If the customer is connected with a state whose system of 
detecting and preventing money laundering and terrorist financing doesn’t meet 
the international standards, banks must, in order to fulfil the enhanced reporting 
obligation, make a report to the FIU in cases where: 
1) the customer does not provide the bank with a clarification that they have 
requested to fulfil the obligation to obtain information 
2) they consider this clarification to be unreliable 
3) the clarification obtained by the bank doesn’t provide sufficient information on 
the grounds for the transaction and on the origin of funds 
4) the legal person can not be identified 
5) the beneficial owner can not be identified or established in a reliable manner 
(Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 
503/2008.) 
To be able to recognize unusual and suspicious transactions, it is important that 
CDD has been adequately conducted. It is all based on “knowing your 
customer”. When the bank detects a suspicious transaction, it has the obligation 
to clarify the background of that transaction along with the origin of funds 
involved in that transaction. If the transactions still seems suspicious, even after 
obtaining more information on it, the bank has to submit a report of suspicious 
transaction to the FIU. A suspicious transaction report is not an official police 
report by its nature, and the bank doesn’t have to know what crime the funds 
involved are related to. (Financial Supervisory Auhtority 2010, 38-39.) 
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Banks must suspend a transaction for further inquiries or refuse to conduct a 
transaction if the transaction is suspicious, or if they suspect that the funds 
involved are used for terrorist financing or an attempt to do so. However, if it is 
not possible to refrain from conducting the transaction, or if refusing to conduct 
the transaction is likely to hinder finding out the beneficial owner of the 
transaction, banks may carry out the transaction and then make the report 
afterwards. A commanding police officer working at the FIU may give the bank 
an order to refrain from conducting transactions for no more than five working 
days, if that is necessary for detecting or preventing money laundering or 
terrorist financing. (Act on Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and 
Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 26.)  
Banks are liable for the financial loss sustained by their customers only if they 
have failed to carry out such CDD measures as can be reasonably required 
from them, considering the prevailing circumstances. (Act on Detecting and 
Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, Section 39). 
Therefore as long as the banks comply with the CDD rules, they shouldn’t be 
worried about being liable for customers’ financial loss sustained as a result of 
clearing a transaction, reporting a suspicious transaction or suspending or 
refusing to conduct a transaction. 
I asked Mr Y how often Bank X reports suspicious transactions to  the FIU, but 
understandably he could not answer the question. I also asked how often Bank 
X has to refuse to e.g. open an account. He stated that “It is only on rare 
occasions that we have to refuse to open an account. The reason for refusal is 
pretty much always the fact that we are not provided with sufficient information” 
(Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015). Whenever Bank X has to refuse to open an 
account, the customer is simply told that he/she is not welcomed as a customer 
due to missing documents, if that’s the case. The customer is never told that the 
bank is considering making a suspicious transaction report. (Mr Y, interview 
11.11.2015.) 
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4.7 Training and protecting employees 
Banks have to provide their empolyees with proper training in order to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of the AML Act. Banks must have internal 
instructions in place concerning CDD procedures, fulfilment of the obligation to 
obtain information, and fulfilment of the reporting obligation. In addition to the 
training obligation, banks have to take appropriate and adequate measures to 
protect the employees who submit suspicious transaction reports. (Act on 
Detecting and Preventing Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing 503/2008, 
Section 34.) It is especially important to train those employees who work closely 
with customers and product development, along with clearing, custody, and 
payment systems. It is also strongly recommended to keep training records. 
(Financial Supervisory Authority 2010, 17.) 
According to the AML Act, banks may not disclose the making of a suspicious 
transaction report to the customer subject to the suspicion. (Financial 
Supervisory Authority 2010, 18). However, it may be intimidating for an 
employee to make a report of suspicious transaction even if he/she doesn’t 
disclose the reporting to the customer. If the suspicious transaction report leads 
to police investigations, the customer subject to the suspicion might be able to 
guess who made the report — especially if the employee refused earlier to 
conduct the suspicious transaction. Thus the bank should ensure that the 
customer doesn’t get any information concering the identity of the employee 
who made the report (Financial Supervisory Authority 2010, 18). 
The employees in Bank X are trained on a regular basis. “We have had 
traditional training courses, but nowadays online training courses are commonly 
used. The employees are also monitored to ensure that they have completed 
the courses. It is all documented.” (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) When it comes 
to protecting the employees who submit suspicious transaction reports, Bank X 
“has never needed to use any special measures to protect the employees” (Mr 
Y, interview 11.11.2015). It is never disclosed to the customer if a suspicious 
transaction report is made. Neither can the customer link the report – if it leads 
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to investigations – to the employee who submitted it. If an employee was to be 
threatened, the police would come along. (Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015.) 
4.8 Cost efficiency 
I was interested in knowing whether the CDD procedures are perceived only as 
a time consuming cost, or if they bring any benefits to the bank. I also wondered 
if the government finances any of the bank’s costs arising from the AML and 
CTF activities. According to Mr Y, CDD might have first been perceived as 
inconvenient and frustrating, but nowadays the positive sides of it can be found. 
“The more we know about our customers, the better we can serve them” (Mr Y, 
interview 11.11.2015). The government doesn’t help covering the costs arising 
from the procedures, though. When asking about the most challenging thing in 
applying the AML Act in practice, Mr Y stated: “The most challenging thing has 
been the development of sufficient monitoring systems. Also the fact that the 
information has to be available in all channels has brought some challenges” 
(Mr Y, interview 11.11.2015). 
4.9 Criticism 
AML laundering laws have also been seen as pointless. According to Daniel 
Mitchell (2012), “They impose very high costs and force banks to spy on their 
customers, but they are utterly ineffective as a weapon against criminal activity”. 
The main point of Mitchell’s article is that AML rules hurt the poor most of all: of 
those without a bank account, 25% said high cost to be a factor. One of the 
reasons the costs are so high is that “banks incur regulatory expenses for every 
customer, in large part because of anti-money laundering requirements, and 
then pass those on to consumers” (Mitchell 2012). 
John Walker, the CEO of Crime Trends Analysis in Australia, was interviewed 
by David Smith for an article that was published in Economy Watch in 2011. 
Walker strongly criticized the current measures taken to tackle money 
laundering. “The concentration on money laundering serves the wealthy 
countries well, because it is based in the concept of ‘suspicious’ transactions.  It 
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is dead easy for a white collar criminal to make transactions non-suspicious, so 
the burden falls on those people who peddle drugs at the retail end of the 
market” (Smith 2011). Walker suggests that a return to focussing on the original 
crime – and particularly to the involvement of the legal and accounting 
professions in those crimes – would be more effective than what is being done 
now (Smith 2011). Walker has his point. There is barely any data available 
concerning whether money laundering and terrorist financing have decreased 
due to the AML and CTF laws. However, as stated earlier, a money laundering 
investigation is often the only way to locate the hidden assets and establish the 
identity of the criminals responsible. 
Jon Matonis (2013) discusses the fundamentality of money laundering in his 
article “Money Laundering is a Financial Thoughtcrime”. He states that “Money 
laundering has been called the thoughtcrime of finance. Isn’t it really just 
banking with someone's possibly nefarious intentions attached to the act? It is 
like buying a drive-thru donut in a stolen vehicle. The theft of the vehicle may 
have been illegal and immoral but the act of purchasing a donut is not” (Matonis 
2013). According to him, money laundering is not a pre-crime but rather a post-
crime. He also states that “it is difficult to identify the victim, other than the bank 
shareholders that must expend millions of dollars for the proactive compliance 
required as the state's deputized enforcers” (Matonis 2013). Matonis’s article 
was published in American Banker –magazine, and thus his opinion is not very 
surprising. 
Michelle Frasher (2015) discusses in her article, which was also published in 
American Banker, the duality of data in finance. “The dual nature of financial 
data means that it is simultaneously governed by two regimes: anti-money-
laundering and counter-terrorism finance laws that seek to protect the financial 
system from fraud, crime, and political violence; and data protection and privacy 
laws that seek to protect an individual's identity and choices from government 
and private abuse.” She states that multinational banks may find it difficult to 
comply with one without violating the other, especially when different countries 
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prioritize different regimes. Thus banks must be especially careful when 
handling CDD data. 
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5 CONCLUSION 
Money laundering is a worldwide issue as it is a consequence of almost all profit 
generating crime. Criminals try to make their illegally-gained funds appear legal 
so that they can use them without raising suspicion. Due to the illegal nature of 
money laundering, it is difficult to estimate the total amount of money that goes 
through the laundry cycle. There is not accurate data available at all. However, 
it has been estimated that the amount of money laundered globally per year is 2 
– 5% of global GDP, or 800 billion – 2 trillion in US dollars. In Finland, most 
laundered money originates from economic crimes, whereas globally most 
originates from drug related crimes. 
Traditionally money laundering comprises three stages: placement, layering, 
and integration. The placement stage represents the initial entry of the illicit 
cash or proceeds of crime into the financial system. Layering stage involves 
stratifying the financial transaction. In the integration stage the seemingly 
legitimate funds are integrated into the perpetrators life. All these stages involve 
using different methods. In addition to using traditional methods, such as co-
mingling illicit funds with sales receipts of a legitimate cash focused business, 
the using of modern money laundering methods is increasing. Technology is 
heavily involved in the modern money laundering methods, which makes the 
tracing of illicit funds more difficult. 
Financial service providers, among others, are used by criminals as 
intermediaries to launder their illicit money. It is crucial for the criminals to get 
their illegally-gained funds into the legal financial system. However, placing 
large amounts of money into the legitimate financial system may arise 
suspicions: in this placement stage, criminals are the most vulnerable to getting 
caught. International standards, laws and regulations concentrate on the 
prevention of money laundering, and therefore it is highlighted that financial 
service providers – as well as others subject to the reporting obligation – should 
recognize customers’ unusual activities and report suspicious transactions. To 
63 
 
TURKU UNIVERSITY OF APPLIED SCIENCES THESIS | Heta Kuustie 
be able to recognize unusual activities, banks must know their customers well 
enough. 
The FATF has created a series of recommendations on combating money 
laundering and financing of terrorism. The recommendations have been 
adopted by over 190 countries. Also the EU rules in the area of combating 
money laundering and financing of terrorism are largely based on standards 
created by the FATF. The Finnish AML Act is then again based on the EU rules. 
The act applies to, among others, banks. The Financial Supervisory Authority is 
responsible for ensuring that the procedures, risk management and internal 
control of banks meet the statutory requirements. Whenever the bank has a 
suspicion of money laundering or terrorist financing it is obliged to report the 
suspicion to the Financial Intelligence Unit. 
The key principles of the AML Act are Customer Due Diligence (CDD) and a 
risk-based approach to money laundering and terrorist financing. CDD means 
the procedures related to customer identification, knowing one’s customer, and 
ongoing monitoring. Banks must have sufficient information on their customers’ 
activities, financial status, banking practices, and purpose for which the services 
are used. Banks need to find out what kind of services their customers need. 
Furthermore, the law requires banks to ask where their customers’ incoming 
money comes from and what the money is going to be used for. A risk-based 
assessment means that banks have internal operational methods and 
processes in place, adequate with the nature and size of their operations, for 
assessing the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing related to their 
customers, services and products. 
I interviewed the service manager Mr Y of a Finnish bank (called Bank X in the 
thesis) to see how the CDD measures are applied in practice. Unfortunately Mr 
Y was not allowed to give very accurate answers. Due to the vague answers, I 
had difficulties to answer the research question number 3. However, I also 
interested to know how customers react to questions about their political 
influence, the origin of their funds, and so on. When I worked a cashier service 
officer, I noticed how some customers got irritated when they were asked these 
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personal questions, and wondered if this was the case in Bank X, too. 
According to the service manager, Mr Y, most customers react positively and 
understand why such questions are asked. However, there are still customers 
who don’t quite understand why the origin of their funds is any one the bank’s 
business. Thus it is important that the customers are informed about the AML 
Act and the fact that banks are obliged by the law to know their customers. 
The AML laws have also been criticized as expensive yet ineffective. They are 
based on the concept of suspicious transactions, and “it is dead easy for a white 
collar criminal to make transactions non-suspicious” (Smith 2011). Applying 
CDD measures is also time-consuming. In addition to that, banks have had 
challenges in developing their monitoring systems to a sufficient level. However, 
as Mr Y stated, where CDD might have first been perceived as inconvenient 
and frustrating, now the positive sides of it can be found. The more the bank 
knows about their customers, the better the customers can be served. 
5.1 Self-evaluation 
As stated in the introduction, the purpose of this thesis was not to look for a 
solution to a problem, but rather to come up with an information package on 
money laundering and what measures banks must take in order to prevent 
money laundering. The idea was to collect information from various sources in 
order to identify the main points in the anti-money laundering area. I think I 
managed to gather the most substantial information to this thesis about money 
laundering, money laundering prevention and how banks should apply the AML 
Act. I collected information from various sources that were as recent as 
possible, and which I considered to be realiable. Unfortunately I had to keep 
some of the topics rather brief in order to keep the thesis focused. The more 
research I did on money laundering, the more interested I became in it: it would 
be interesting to do research on whether money laundering and terrorist 
financing have decreased due to the AML laws and regulations. It would also be 
interesting to do research on how banks’ monitoring systems could be 
developed to be more effective. As discussed in the chapter 3.5, Sweden’s 
Financial Supervisory Authority fined two big banking groups for non-
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compliance with the AML and CTF legislation. Thus it can be concluded that 
even big banks lack effective systems to track suspicious transactions. 
I wished I could have approach the topic of money laundering prevention from a 
more interesting point of view as this thesis is now basically a literature / law 
review including an interview to support the theory. However, the practical part 
of the thesis was very difficult to conduct. The bank where I worked as a cashier 
service officer didn’t agree to give any information, whereas the service 
manager whom I interviewed could not give very exact answers to be published. 
Due to the nature of this subject, it is completely understandable, though. If a 
more in-depth research was to be done as an assignment given by a bank, for 
example for developing the monitoring systems, it would have to be made just 
for the bank, and it could not be published. Overall, I think I was able to collect 
the most valid points of money laundering prevention to this thesis, and 
although it wasn’t written as assignment for any bank, it could be used as an 
orientation guide for new employees in the banking sector. Money laundering 
prevention and CDD is a part of everyday work in a bank, and thus it is 
important that employees in the banking sector have sufficient information on 
what they are obliged to do by the AML Act. 
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Interview questions 
Haastattelun pohjana käytetään lakia rahanpesun ja terrorismin 
rahoittamisen estämisestä ja selvittämisestä (503/2008) 
Asiakkaan tunteminen ja riskiperusteinen arviointi 
”Ilmoitusvelvollisella tulee olla rahanpesun ja terrorismin rahoittamisen riskienhallintaa koskevat, 
ilmoitusvelvollisen toiminnan luonteeseen ja laajuuteen nähden riittävät menetelmät. Ilmoitusvelvollisen on 
rahanpesun ja terrorismin rahoituksen riskejä arvioidessaan otettava huomioon toimialaansa, tuotteisiinsa, 
palveluihinsa, teknologian kehitykseen, asiakkaisiinsa ja näiden liiketoimintaan ja -toimiin liittyvät 
rahanpesun ja terrorismin rahoituksen riskit.” 
 Minkälaista riskiarviointia Pankki X käyttää? 
 Minkälaisiin riskiluokkiin asiakkaat luokitellaan? 
 Miten toiminta on organisoitu? Kuka vastaa riskien hallinnan ja sisäisen 
valvonnan järjestämisestä? 
 Miten varmistetaan, että sovittuja periaatteita noudatetaan yhtenäisesti 
koko pankkiryhmässä? 
Selonottovelvollisuus ja jatkuva seuranta 
”Ilmoitusvelvollisen on hankittava tietoja asiakkaansa toiminnasta, tämän liiketoiminnan laadusta ja 
laajuudesta sekä perusteet palvelun tai tuotteen käyttämiselle. 
Ilmoitusvelvollisen on järjestettävä asiakkaan toiminnan laatuun ja laajuuteen sekä riskeihin nähden riittävä 
seuranta sen varmistamiseksi, että asiakkaan toiminta vastaa sitä kokemusta ja tietoa, joka 
ilmoitusvelvollisella on asiakkaasta ja tämän toiminnasta. 
Ilmoitusvelvollisen on erityisesti kiinnitettävä huomiota liiketoimiin, jotka rakenteeltaan tai suuruudeltaan 
taikka ilmoitusvelvollisen koon tai toimipaikan osalta poikkeavat tavanomaisesta. Samoin on meneteltävä, 
jos liiketoimilla ei ole ilmeistä taloudellista tarkoitusta tai ne eivät sovi yhteen sen kokemuksen tai tietojen 
kanssa, jotka ilmoitusvelvollisella on asiakkaasta. Tarvittaessa liiketoimeen liittyvien varojen alkuperä on 
selvitettävä.” 
 Minkälaisia kysymyksiä Pankki X kysyy uutta asiakassuhdetta 
perustettaessa? Kuinka usein perustietoja päivitetään? 
 Miten asiakkaat suhtautuvat, kun heiltä tiedustellaan yksityiskohtaisia 
tietoja heidän rahaliikenteestään, poliittisesta vaikutusvallastaan, jne.? 
 Kerrotaanko asiakkaalle, miksi pankki kysyy? 
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 Miten jatkuva seuranta on järjestetty? 
 Miten tunnistetetaan tavanomaisesta poikkeavat liiketoimet? 
 Miten asiakkaat suhtautuvat, kun heiltä tiedustellaan varojen alkuperää 
suurta käteistalletusta tehtäessä? 
Tehostettu asiakkaan tuntemisvelvollisuus 
”Ilmoitusvelvollisen tulee noudattaa asiakkaan tuntemista koskevia toimia tehostetusti, jos asiakkaaseen, 
palveluun, tuotteeseen tai liiketoimeen liittyy tavanomaista suurempi rahanpesun tai terrorismin 
rahoittamisen riski taikka jos asiakkaalla tai liiketoimella on liittymäkohta valtioon, jonka rahanpesun ja 
terrorismin rahoittamisen estämis- ja selvittelyjärjestelmä ei täytä kansainvälisiä velvoitteita.” 
 Kenen laatimaa / mitä listaa korkean riskin maista käytetään? (FATF, 
Basel AML Index, Suomen valtioneuvoston päätös, EU:n ja YK:n 
finanssipakotelistat jne.) 
Velvollisuus tehdä ilmoitus epäilyttävästä liiketoiminnasta, liiketoimen 
keskeyttäminen tai siitä kieltäytyminen 
 Joudutaanko ilmoituksia epäilyttävästä liiketoiminnasta tekemään usein? 
 Kuinka usein esimerkiksi tilin avaamisesta joudutaan kieltäytymään? 
Mikä on tällaisessa tapauksessa tyypillinen perustelu kieltäytymiselle? 
 Miten asiakkaat suhtautuvat, jos liiketoimesta kieltäydytään? Miten 
asiakkaalle perustellaan luontevasti liiketoimesta kieltäytyminen, kun 
hänelle ei saa paljastaa, että liiketoimesta on tehty ilmoitus? 
Työntekijöiden koulutus ja suojeleminen 
”Ilmoitusvelvollisen on huolehdittava, että sen työntekijät saavat asianmukaisen koulutuksen tämän lain ja 
sen nojalla annettujen säännösten noudattamisen varmistamiseksi. Ilmoitusvelvollisen tulee toteuttaa 
asianmukaiset ja riittävät toimenpiteet niiden työntekijöiden suojelemiseksi, jotka tekevät 23 tai 24 §:ssä 
tarkoitetun ilmoituksen.” 
 Miten henkilökuntaa käytännössä koulutetaan rahanpesun estämisen 
saralla? 
 Miten niitä työntekijöitä suojellaan, jotka ovat tehneet ilmoituksen 
epäilyttävästä liiketoiminnasta? 
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Yleisiä kysymyksiä 
 Miten talletusautomaattien käyttöä valvotaan / rajoitetaan? 
 Rahoittaako valtio pankin valvontatoimia rahanpesun estämiseksi, vai 
ovatko kulut vain pankin vastuulla? 
 Onko asiakkaan perinpohjaisesta tuntemisesta hyötyä myös pankille 
esimerkiksi myynnin kohdentamista ajatellen, vai koetaanko tietojen 
kysely lähinnä aikaavievänä kulueränä? 
 Minkälaisia haasteita rahanpesun estämiseen pankissa liittyy? 
Lisäksi 
 Onko mahdollista saada ”selvitys varojen alkuperästä” -lomaketta 
opinnäytetyön liitteeksi? 
 Onko mahdollista saada liitteeksi myös jonkinlaista asiakkaan 
perustietolomaketta? 
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